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“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence 
of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of 
representative government.”1 
“No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in 
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must 
live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under-
mined.”2 
This Article examines the extent to which the franchise of current and 
former felons has been contentious in a range of jurisdictions. Courts in Eu-
rope, Canada, and Australia have recently moved to protect the voting rights of 
prisoners.3 So far, the United States has been an anomalous jurisdiction with 
respect to voting rights of prisoners. Almost all states prohibit from voting a 
person in jail for a felony offense, a majority prohibits a person from voting 
whilst on probation, and some maintain the prohibition on the convicted per-
son’s voting even after the person has been released from prison and is not un-
der probation.4 Data from the Sentencing Project suggests that combined these 
 
* Professor Anthony Gray, University of Southern Queensland.  Thanks to Danielle Pierre and the 
Berkeley Journal of African-American Law & Policy for their editorial assistance with this Arti-
cle. 
 1.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
 2.  Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
 3.  See, e.g., Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 681 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) [NOTE: THIS 
IS A NEW PROPER WAY TO CITE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS], 
Sauve v. Canada [2002] 3 S.C.R 519, and Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 CLR 162 
(Austl.). 
 4.  These states are Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia. See, e.g., VA. CONST., art. II, 
§ 1 (2002); FLA. STAT. § 97.041(2)(b) (2001); see also Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the 
United States, THESENTENCINGPROJECT.ORG (last visited Dec. 22, 2013) (for details of each in-
dividual state’s approach). Indeed, the author’s interest in this topic piqued while travelling to 
Richmond, Virginia. The front page of the Richmond Times-Dispatch on January 15, 2013, re-
ferred to a committee vote that killed off mooted reforms to voting entitlements of felons in that 
state. See Disenfranchised Ex-Cons a Stain on Virginia’s Democracy, WASHINGTON POST, May 
28, 2013. 
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provisions deny the vote to almost six million individuals. About forty-five 
percent of these individuals have completed their sentence.5 
Particularly in the United States, but in other jurisdictions as well, felons’ 
voting rights are inextricably caught up in racial issues. It is not news  that the 
incarceration rate of some racial minorities, including African Americans in the 
United States and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the Australia, 
author’s home country,6 is higher than for the non-racial minority population. 
As a result, whether by design or by accident (a crucial distinction, according to 
the jurisprudence I later discuss), the impact of disenfranchising prisoners dis-
proportionately affects racial minorities. Data from the Sentencing Project sug-
gests that approximately 2.2 million African Americans are disenfranchised—
7.7% of the African American population, compared with 1.8% of the non-
African American population.7 This takes place in a historical context of con-
tinual attempts by some states and the federal government to deny African 
American people the right to vote, as well as the broader context to deny eco-
nomic and education opportunities. It is tempting to see the disenfranchisement 
of current or ex-prisoners as just another in the long line of attempts, which I 
document later in this Article, to disempower racial minorities. My own coun-
try, Australia, is certainly not blameless in this regard either; a referendum to 
change the Constitution to recognize indigenous people as people, rather than 
fauna, occurred as recently as 1967, and the final Australian state conferred In-
digenous Australians with voting rights as recently as 1965.8 
Denial of the right to vote to current or former prisoners is somewhat 
analogous with the British concept of “civil death,” originally describing the 
status of a person sentenced to life imprisonment.9 As the term suggests, it en-
compassed the convict losing privileges typically attached to an individual, 
such as the right to own property, the right to choose who would inherit your 
property, the right to bring legal action, the right to work, and the right to vote. 
The American colonies never applied the “civil death” itself, but remnants of it 
 
 5.  Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4; Losing the Vote: The Impact of Fel-
ony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THESENTENCINGPROJECT.ORG (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2013).  
 6.  Winder notes that an Aboriginal person is thirteen times more likely to be incarcer-
ated in Australia than a non-Aboriginal person. Megan A Winder, Disproportionate Disenfran-
chisement of Aboriginal Prisoners: A Conflict of Law That Australia Should Address, 19 PAC. 
RIM. L. & POLY. J. 387, 410 (2010). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were the original 
inhabitants of the land now identified as Australia. Id. They have suffered from entrenched racism, 
as well as many of the social disadvantages familiar to those of African American heritage. Id. 
 7.  Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4. 
 8.  Megan Winder notes that the Commonwealth Franchise Act of 1902 explicitly ex-
cluded indigenous Australians from being able to vote, unless their state allowed it. WINDER, su-
pra note 6, at 393; Graeme Orr, The Voting Rights Ratchet: Rowe v. Electoral Commissioner, 22 
PUB. L. REV. 83, 87 (2011). 
 9.  See Special Project, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. 
REV. 929, 942–43 (1970); Alec Ewald, Civil Death: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disen-
franchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045 (2002). 
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are evident in the long tradition of denial of the right to vote to those convicted 
of particular crimes. 
Of course, voting is seen as one of the most fundamental rights of all in a 
democracy, and the United States is the leading democracy in the world, the 
leader of the free world. In 2008 and 2012, the United States elected an African 
American president. Many argued that the election of Barack Obama heralded a 
“post-racial” period in United States history, a relatively quick turnaround from 
the days of segregation, white supremacy, and slavery.  However, to a non-
American, the continued acceptance of laws that operate to deny the vote to 
prisoners and ex-prisoners, with their clearly disproportionate impact on racial 
minorities, serves as a reminder of those unedifying parts of American history 
reflecting racial discrimination and intolerance. Of course, I believe and hope 
that, in time, these voting laws are seen as the anomaly, not the election of an 
African American president or the full participation of all people in the political 
process, regardless of race. 
This Article considers the current legal position regarding voting rights of 
prisoners and ex-prisoners in a range of jurisdictions, before considering the 
need for a reform. This reform will be centered on the position in the United 
States. While in the past I have suggested how Australian law could be en-
riched by the American jurisprudence on a range of human rights issues,10 on 
the question of the right to work, the United States jurisprudence would benefit 
from consideration of other jurisdictions’ jurisprudence. 
In Part I of this Article, I outline the current United States position with 
respect to the voting rights of prisoners. In Part II, I consider relevant interna-
tional developments to see whether United States law could benefit from con-
sideration of international developments. One of the themes of the international 
literature is that voting rights are recognized as expression, although much of 
the case law concerns interpretation of provisions that directly confer the right 
to vote. Picking up on this theme of voting rights as expression, Part III consid-
ers whether the First Amendment could be utilized in aid of voting rights. 
The paper makes two arguments advocating for stronger American consti-
tutional protection of voting rights of prisoners: (1) the current American posi-
tion is contrary to much of the comparable democracies’ case law, which rea-
soning is compelling, such as seeing voting as expressive activity; and (2) 
development of the protection of voting rights law in the United States can be 
based on the First Amendment, separation of powers, or other democratic prin-
ciples enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. 
 
 10.  See, e.g., Anthony Gray, Forfeiture and the Civil/Criminal Divide, 15(1) NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 32 (2012); Anthony Gray, The Right to Silence: Using American and European Law to 
Protect a Fundamental Right, 16(3) NEW CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Anthony Gray, Ra-
cial Vilification and Freedom of Speech in Australian and Elsewhere, 41(2) COMMON L. WORLD 
REV. 167 (2012); Anthony Gray, Applying Provisions of the Constitution to Protect Human Rights 
from Intrusion by State Parliaments, 18(4) AUSTRALIAN J. ADMIN. L. 229 (2012). 
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I. UNITED STATES AND VOTING RIGHTS11 
“I take a dim view of this pathological search for discrimination. It is 
about time the Court faced the fact that the white people of the South do not 
like the colored people.”12 
The era of reconstruction in the late 1860s must have seemed very promis-
ing for race relations, with the passage of the three amendments abolishing 
slavery, apparently enshrining equal protection,13 and proscribing the denial of 
voting rights due to things such as race.14 In reality, the Southern states resorted 
to indirect means15—by granting extensive discretion to government officials in 
voters’ registration,16 limiting the right to vote in primary elections to whites on 
the basis that political parties as private organizations were not subject to con-
stitutional restriction,17 introducing poll taxes,18 instituting literacy tests,19 
denying voting privileges for those convicted of crimes of “moral turpitude,”20 
 
 11.  There is a vast literature on the question of disenfranchisement of prisoners. See, 
e.g., Alice Harvey, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need 
for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145 (1994); Virginia Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: 
The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727 (1998); Angela 
Behrens, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and Legislative Challenges to 
Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2005); Andrew Shapiro, Challenging 
Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L. J. 537 
(1994); The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality and the Purity of the Bal-
lot Box, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989); The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on the 
States Power to Disfranchise Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 297 (1967); 
Ewald, supra note 9. 
 12.  HARRY ASHMORE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS: A MEMOIR OF RACE AND POLITICS 
1944-1994 342 (1994) (quoting William Rehnquist, former Chief Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court). 
 13.  However, Section 2 acted as an apparent limitation on the equal protection contem-
plated by the Fourteenth Amendment, an issue that would become critical more than a century 
later in the Ramirez decision of 1974; it was politically inadvisable to go to the country in 1866 on 
a platform having anything to do with negro suffrage. Alexander Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44 (1955). 
 14.  U.S. CONST. amend. XII–XV. 
 15.  Some were quite open, with the delegate to the Virginia State Constitutional Con-
vention claiming that the convention was elected with a view to the elimination of every negro 
voter. 2 Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention 3076 (Va. 1906). 
Everybody knows that this Convention has done its best to disfranchise the negro. 2 Official Pro-
ceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Alabama 4782 (1901); PAUL LEWINSON, 
RACE, CLASS AND PARTY (1932); Shapiro, supra note 11. 
 16.  Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), although the court did strike down a 
law that, while race-neutral on its face, was shown to be applied in a racially discriminatory man-
ner, as being offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 17.  Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947). 
 18.  Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the twenty-fourth amend-
ment abolished this possibility). 
 19.  Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Election, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966). 
 20.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi infamously claimed that African Americans were 
more likely than whites to be convicted of certain crimes: “by reason of its previous condition of 
servitude and dependence, [the African American] race had acquitted or attenuated certain particu-
larities of habit, of temperament and of character, which clearly distinguished it, as a race, from 
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and drawing unusual electoral boundaries to minimize the influence of African 
American voters.21 Furthermore, extensive empirical evidence links disenfran-
chisement laws with race,22 as well as disproportionate outcomes for African 
Americans in criminal justice system.23 
What is interesting is that denial of the right to vote to prisoners and ex-
prisoners, which as earlier indicated impacts disproportionately on African 
Americans just as the above laws did, survives. Perhaps it survives because it 
might be justified for reasons other than out and out racism.24 Such laws did 
pre-exist the right of African American voters to vote. However, given devel-
opments in the past half-century, the restrictions appear anomalous.25 In all of 
the contexts above, the courts have seen through legislative attempts to achieve 
 
that of the whites—a patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory within narrow 
limits . . . and its criminal members given rather to furtive offences than to the robust crimes of the 
whites.” Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 266–67 (1896) (connecting African Americans with 
crimes such as bribery, burglary, theft, arson, fraud, perjury, forgery, embezzlement, and bigamy, 
apparently justifying disenfranchisement in relation to those categories of crime); Williams, 170 
U.S. 213; Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
 21.  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). 
 22.  Behrens, Uggen, and Mazza found (a) each one percent increase in the percentage of 
prisoners who were non-white increased the odds by approximately ten percent that the state 
would enact felon disenfranchisement laws; (b) a ten percent increase in a states non-white prison 
population raises the odds of passing an ex-felon disenfranchisement law by about fifty percent; 
and (c) the percentage of African American prison inmates was a negative indicator of repeal of 
felon disenfranchisement laws. Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manip-
ulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in 
the United States 1850-2002, 109(3) AM. J. SOC. 559, 586, 588, 594 (2003). 
 23.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1989). 
Schneider and Smykla found that African American defendants were much more likely to be exe-
cuted than a white defendant committing the same crime. VICTORIA SCHNEIDER & JOHN 
SMYKLA, A SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1608-1987: THE ESPY 
FILE; ROBERT M. BOHM, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT RESEARCH 1, 11; Kim 
Forde-Mazrui, Learning Law Through the Lens of Race 21 J. L. & POL. 1 (2005). It is reported 
that in seven states, between eighty and ninety percent of drug offenders sent to prison are African 
American, and that in fifteen states, African Americans are jailed on drug charges at a rate 20–25 
times higher than whites (and not accounted for by different drug usage rates among races). 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE: RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 12(2) (2000). Among young offenders who had never been 
to prison before, African-American offenders are six times more likely to be incarcerated than 
whites for identical crimes. EILEEN POE-YAGAMATA & MICHAEL JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR 
SOME: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM [PINCITE 
NEEDED] (2000). 
 24.  Non-racial explanations and excuses for the systematic mass incarceration of people 
of color are plentiful. It is the genius of the new system of control that it can always be defended 
on non-racial grounds, given the rarity of a noose or a racial slur in connection with any particular 
criminal case. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 100 (2010). 
 25.  Shapiro, supra note 11, at 538. Criminal disenfranchisement—the denial of the vote 
to citizens convicted of crimes—was the most subtle method of excluding blacks from the fran-
chise, felon disenfranchisement laws have been more effective in eliminating black voters in the 
age of mass incarceration than they were during Jim Crow. Id.; ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 
187–88 . Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggan found that there was a positive correlation between 
the size of a state’s African-American population and the existence of felon disenfranchisement 
laws. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGAN, LOCKED OUT 67 (2006). 
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indirectly what they could not accomplish directly. Courts have recognized that 
rights are weak when they can be attacked by indirect means, and have largely 
been alert to such possibilities: 
[t]he United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants to 
all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials without re-
striction by any State because of race . . . constitutional rights would be of little 
value if they could be . . . indirectly denied.26 
However, the Supreme Court surprisingly has not been as robust in the de-
fense of such a fundamental democratic right,27 despite its acceptance of the 
right to vote as pivotal and “preservative of all other rights.”28 Taking the Court 
at its word, we might have seen a more robust response to felon disenfran-
chisement than what the following record reflects. 
First, Richardson v. Ramirez squarely rejected a challenge to the denial of 
voting rights to ex-prisoners on the Fourteenth Amendment grounds.29 While 
conferring equal protection rights on all United States citizens in Section 1, in 
Section 2, it provides that: 
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the United States Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a state, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall 
bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such 
state.30 
The majority noted that at the time of the passage of this amendment, a 
majority of states excluded from voting those convicted of committing serious 
crimes.31  Congress’s 1867 Reconstruction Act, establishing the conditions un-
der which former confederate states would be re-admitted to the Union, specifi-
cally referred to a state constitution being consistent with the United States 
Constitution, and framed by delegates voted in by male citizens of the state, but 
excluding those convicted of serious crime. The majority used this as evidence 
 
 26.  Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944). 
 27.  There are so many constitutional arguments against the disenfranchisement of felons 
that one can only wonder at the survival of the practice. George Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as 
Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Use of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1903 (1999). 
 28.  Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 370. Or, as John Ely puts it, we cannot trust the ins to decide 
who stays out, and it is therefore incumbent on the courts to ensure not only that no one is denied 
the vote for no reason, but also that where there is a reason (as there will be) it had better be a 
convincing one. JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 120 (1980). Ely claims that judicial re-
view should be about unblocking stoppages in the democratic system, disenfranchisement being 
the quintessential stoppage. Id. at 117. 
 29.  Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 30.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§1–2 (emphasis added). 
 31.  Richardson, 418 U.S. at 48. 
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that Section 2 “means what it says,” and specifically contemplates that the right 
to vote may be removed in respect of a person convicted of a crime.32  They 
concluded it was impossible to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment precluded 
the removal of a right to vote from prisoners, when Section 2 of that Amend-
ment positively seemed to contemplate such measure.33 
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined, wrote a strong dis-
sent.34  They took a very different view of the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. They argued it was a response to the Southern states refusing to 
enfranchise African-Americans following the end of the American Civil War, 
and so presented them with a choice of either enfranchising such citizens, or 
losing congressional representation.35 This occurred in an era when it would 
have been politically unpalatable to explicitly grant African Americans voting 
rights. The literal wording in Section 2 should not be considered frozen in time, 
forever perpetuating a time when voting rights were denied to particular sec-
tions of society, including prisoners. 
Justices Marshall and Brennan reasserted the right to vote as being the es-
sence of a democratic society, with restrictions on it striking at the heart of rep-
resentative government.36 Any exclusion on the universal franchise had to be 
shown to be conducive to a legitimate and substantial state interest, minimally 
invasive, with no alternative to achieving the state’s legitimate end with laws 
impacting less on the constitutionally protected interest.37 The act of disenfran-
chising ex-prisoners did not pass the test—there was no basis for asserting that 
prisoners had less interest in the democratic process than others.38 The provi-
sion was not limited to those who broke election laws. Any legitimate concern 
the state had with voter fraud could be dealt with in ways much less intrusive 
on the constitutional right to vote than disenfranchisement.39 These judges re-
jected disenfranchisement as a hangover from the “fogs and fictions” of feudal 
jurisprudence, without due regard to its literal significance or the extent of in-
fringement upon the spirit of the American system of government.40 Unfortu-
nately this was, and remains, a minority view, and the fogs and fictions per-
sist.41 
 
 32.  Id. at 54–55. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See id. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 35.  Id. at 74; The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on the States, supra note 11, 
at 302–03. 
 36.  Richardson, 418 U.S. at 77. 
 37.  Id. at 78. 
 38.  Id. at 78. 
 39.  Id. at 79–80. 
 40.  Id. at 85–86. 
 41.  The bizarre irony of the majority judgment, in which a provision ostensibly designed 
to improve the access of African-Americans to the franchise has been interpreted so as to restrict 
it, has been noted elsewhere. Disenfranchisement as Punishment, supra note 27, at 1901. 
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Various Courts of Appeals continue to apply the Richardson line to dis-
miss constitutional challenges to prisoner disenfranchisement laws.42 
The courts have also applied the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly in re-
quiring proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose to show a violation.43 
Without discriminatory purpose, it is not enough for a provision to impact dis-
proportionately one race.44 There must be a clear pattern, not explicable on any 
ground other than race.45 By eschewing a results or effects test and insisting on 
proof of improper intent, the Court has made it extremely difficult to challenge 
felon disenfranchisement successfully on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 
Apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs challenging restrictions 
on voting rights have also sought to engage the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit-
ing discrimination due to race with respect to voting, and Section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, prohibiting voting qualifications being used to deny the right to 
vote due to a person’s race.46 These rights were originally interpreted very nar-
rowly, requiring evidence that a particular policy was motivated by racial dis-
crimination to fall foul of either the Fifteenth Amendment or Section 2.47 This 
mirrored the narrow interpretation that was given, and continues to be given, to 
the Fourteenth Amendment in this context. That interpretation had (in the case 
of the Voting Rights Act) and has (in the case of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments) the obvious impact of limiting the protection that the provisions 
would otherwise give to voting rights, given the difficulty in proving motiva-
tion. 
The Act was amended to require courts to consider the effect of provi-
sions, rather than what motivated them. However, it has remained difficult to 
convince courts that prisoner disenfranchisement laws violate the Voting 
Rights Act,48 although some judges (and occasionally courts)49 have dissented 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bush, 405 
F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 43.  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metro 
House Dev. Co. 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214. 
 44.  Pers. Admr. of Mass v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 260 (1979). 
 45.  Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 
 46.  Some argue the fifteenth amendment repealed Section 2 of the fourteenth. Gabriel 
Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amend-
ment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment? 92 GEO. L. J. 259 (2004). 
 47.  City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Hunter, 471 U.S. 222. 
 48.  Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 
102 (2nd Cir. 2004); Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2nd Cir. 1996) (en banc); Johnson, 405 F.3d at 
1214; Harvey, 605 F.3d 1067; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010); Hayden v. Pataki 
449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006). Partly, this is because courts have insisted on a causal connection 
between historic racial discrimination and the disenfranchisement. Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp 
802, 812 (M.D Tenn. 1985); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003). For de-
tailed critique of these cases see Lauren Handelsman, Giving the Barking Dog a Bite: Challenging 
Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875 
(2005); Behrens, supra note 11; Shapiro, supra note 11; Reuven Ziegler, Legal Outlier Again?: 
U.S. Felon Suffrage: Comparative and International Human Rights Perspectives, 29 B. U. INT’L 
L. J. 197 (2011); Ewald, supra note 9, at 1120–30; LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN 
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from this view.50 A court recently claimed that the Act was never intended to 
stop the states from disenfranchising prisoners.51 This ongoing situation has at-
tracted expressions of international concern.52 Given the split circuit decisions 
on the issue of the application of the Voting Rights Act to prisoner disenfran-
chisement provisions, it is to be hoped that the United States Supreme Court 
will clarify the issue in the near future. Such a case would also allow it to re-
consider the 1974 Ramirez interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a de-
velopment that many would applaud. 
The reasoning of the majority in Ramirez is open to strong criticism, as 
the dissenting Justices noted in that case.53 Reasoning in subsequent cases can 
be attacked for its narrowness or, in some cases, incoherence.54 Suggestions 
that other parts of the Constitution apply, including the Eighth Amendment, or 
that the Fifteenth Amendment overrules the relevant aspect of the Fourteenth,55 
have also been made.56 However, these arguments have not gained traction for 
various reasons, as has already been traduced in the literature.57 Rather, I intend 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1094 (1988). This is despite the Supreme Court’s acceptance that the pur-
pose of the Voting Rights Act was to rid the nation of racial discrimination in the context of vot-
ing. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966). 
 49.  Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003); Baker, 85 F.3d at 919. 
 50.  Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1239–51 (Wilson & Barkett, JJ., dissenting); Simmons, 575 
F.3d at 24 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
 51.  Simmons, 575 F.3d at 26; Hayden, 449 F.3d at 305; Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 
405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005); cf. Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Ju-
dicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting 
Rights Initiative, 39(4) U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 646 (2006) (the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
was enacted in response to the continued, massive and unconstitutional exclusion of African-
Americans from the franchise). Clearly, disenfranchisement of felons has a disproportionate im-
pact on African-American people. 
 52.  The United Nations Human Rights Committee has declared that the general depriva-
tion of the right to vote for persons who have received a felony conviction, and in particular those 
who are no longer deprived of liberty, do not meet the requirements of articles 25 or 26 of the 
covenant, nor serves the rehabilitation goals of article 10(3). United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States of America, 15 Septem-
ber 2006; David Sloss, Legislating Human Rights: The Case for Federal Legislation to Facilitate 
Domestic Judicial Application of International Human Rights Treaties, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
445 (2012). Hench claims the Supreme Court has dismantled the Voting Rights Act. Hench, supra 
note 11, at 749. 
 53.  See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 72–86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 54.  For example, in Harvey v. Brewer, the court dismisses an equal protection challenge 
to Arizona’s prisoner disenfranchisement law. Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1067. The petitioners claim 
that they were being denied the fundamental right to vote was rejected on the basis that “felon dis-
enfranchisement is explicitly permitted under the terms of Richardson . . . therefore we do not ap-
ply strict scrutiny as we would if plaintiffs were complaining about the deprivation of a fundamen-
tal right.” Id. at 1079. So, apparently the right to vote is not fundamental in a democracy, at least if 
you are a prisoner. 
 55.  See, e.g., Disenfranchisement as Punishment, supra note 27, at 1904; Chin, supra 
note 41. 
 56.  See, e.g., The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Cruelly Excessive Punishment, 7 
SW. U. L. REV. 124 (1975). 
 57.  E.g., Hench, supra note 11; Behrens, supra note 11; Fletcher, supra note 27. 
9
Gray: Securing Felon's Voting Rights in America
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
12 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN LAW & POLICY  [VOL.  16:1 
to consider other arguments that might be used to attack the constitutionality of 
denying ex-prisoners, and prisoners, the franchise, arguments that have not 
seen much attention in the United States jurisprudence to date. First, I see how 
the case law in other jurisdictions might be applied in the United States context, 
given that other jurisdictions have more robustly defended the right to vote for 
those incarcerated; second, I consider whether the First Amendment might be 
utilized in this context. 
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPARABLE JURISDICTIONS 
In this part, I consider the extent to which voting rights of prisoners have 
been protected in comparable democracies in order to see whether the devel-
opment of American law in this context could be enriched by consideration of 
the experience elsewhere. As I show, each jurisdiction has upheld the voting 
rights of prisoners in the face of government attack. In the case of Australia, 
this has occurred in the absence of a bill of rights. Concerns have been ex-
pressed regarding the disproportionality involved in disenfranchisement, lack 
of convincing justification, and impact on fundamental democratic values. 
A. Australia 
It is worth noting that, unlike most other Western nations, Australia lacks 
a bill of rights. Perhaps as a counterweight to this, some judges in the High 
Court of Australia have found implied rights in the Constitution. In the contro-
versial High Court decision in Roach v Electoral Commissioner,58 a majority of 
the High Court deduced, from sections of the Constitution that mandated that 
the Parliament (Australian Congress) be directly chosen by the people, some-
thing approaching a right to vote.59 The case arose because of amendments to 
electoral legislation concerning the right of those currently in prison to vote. In 
2004, amendments were made to the effect that those in prison serving sentenc-
es of three years or more were denied the right to vote during that period.60 In 
2006, the Act was amended further to deny the right to vote to anyone serving a 
term of imprisonment, regardless of length, for an offense against Common-
wealth or State law.61 By a majority of 4-2, the High Court declared the 2006 
 
 58.  Roach, 233 CLR 162. 
 59.  Sections 7 and 24 of the Australian Constitution require that the senators and mem-
bers of the House of Representatives be directly chosen by the people of the State or the Com-
monwealth respectively. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION ss 7, 24. Judge Gleeson found that these 
sections have come to be a constitutional protection of the right to vote. Roach, 233 CLR at 174. 
The joint reasons describe Sections 7 and 24 as constitutional bedrock. Id. at 198. Interestingly, 
Section 41 of the Australian Constitution does expressly confer a right to vote, but this had been 
interpreted very narrowly by previous High Courts, to apply only to those on the electoral roll at 
the time of federation. R v Pearson; ex parte Sipka (1983) 152 CLR 254 (Austl.). It has been sug-
gested that the existence of Sections 7 and 24 would preclude arbitrary exclusions from the fran-
chise based on gender or race. Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 115 (Austl.). 
 60.  Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Prisoner Voting and Other Measures) Act 
2004 (Cth) (Austl.). 
 61.  Id. 
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amendments were invalid, after a challenge by Roach, an Aboriginal Australi-
an. 
Chief Justice Gleeson noted that the franchise was critical to representa-
tive government and lay at the center of participation in the life of the commu-
nity and citizenship.62 Disenfranchisement of any group of adult citizens would 
have to be well justified, for instance by a rational connection with a position 
on who is considered to be part of a community, capacity to exercise free 
choice,63 or conduct amounting to a rejection of civil responsibility.64 He re-
jected the idea that denial of voting entitlement should be seen as punishment, 
on the basis that a court would have already punished the offender.65 He 
acknowledged that serious offending may warrant “temporary” suspension of 
voting rights,66 but the 2006 amendments here, denying voting rights to all of 
those in prison at the relevant time, went too far.67 The law became arbitrary in 
not taking into account the length of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, and 
by banning short-term prisoners, many only in jail because for a range of rea-
sons non-custodial sentences were not appropriate.68 The plurality judgment 
noted that notions of citizenship and membership of the Australian federal body 
politic were not extinguished by the mere fact of imprisonment. Prisoners re-
mained citizens and members of the Australian community. Their interest and 
duty to their community and how it was governed survived incarceration.69 
 
B. Europe/United Kingdom 
The relevant decision is Hirst v. United Kingdom (No2).70 Hirst had been 
sentenced to a term of discretionary life imprisonment, with a designated part 
of the sentence relating to retribution and deterrence, and a subsequent discre-
tionary aspect based on risk and dangerousness. At the time the prisoner filed 
his application, he had already served the retribution and deterrence aspect of 
his sentence. He sought to challenge laws that prohibited a convicted person in 
 
 62.  Roach, 233 CLR at 174; see also id. at 198 (emphasizing that voting in elections for 
the Parliament lies at the very heart of the system of government for which the Constitution pro-
vides); Rowe, 243 CLR at 112. 
 63.  Roach, 233 CLR at 174. 
 64.  Id. at 175. Preservation of the integrity of the electoral process has also been recog-
nised as a legitimate rationale for limits on the franchise. Rowe, 243 CLR at 61 (Gummow & Bell, 
JJ.), 120 (Crennan, J.). 
 65.  Roach, 233 CLR at 175. 
 66.  Id. at 177. 
 67.  The position of Chief Justice Gleeson can also be argued to be arbitrary, in accepting 
that disenfranchisement may be constitutionally valid if limited to prisoner serving lengthy sen-
tences, but not when applied to all of those in prison at the relevant time. Chief Justice Gleeson 
did not explain what the cut-off point was dividing constitutionality from unconstitutionality. 
 68.  Id. at 182; see also id. at 201 (Gummow, Kirby & Crennan, JJ.). For instance, Chief 
Justice Gleeson found the person’s homelessness, poverty, mental illness or geographical situation 
may practically preclude a non-custodial option. Id. at ???. 
 69.  Id. 199 (Gummow, Kirby & Crennan, JJ.). 
 70.  Hirst, 681 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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jail pursuant to a sentence from voting whilst detained, subject to exceptions 
not relevant here.71 At the time this legislation was passed, a government repre-
sentative stated that loss of a right to vote was part of the punishment that a 
prisoner received. Hirst argued the provisions were incompatible with Article 3 
of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, requiring contract-
ing parties to hold free elections regularly to ensure free expression72 of the 
opinion of the people.73 
The Grand Chamber agreed with Hirst that the United Kingdom legisla-
tion was incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol 1.74 They recognized the es-
sentiality of universal suffrage to the “democratic validity” of the elected legis-
lature, and any departures from this principle could not thwart the free 
expression of the people.75 Prisoners enjoyed other convention rights despite 
their incarceration.76 
The Chamber noted the government’s justifications for the legislation 
based on punishment, and the aim of “enhancing civic responsibility and re-
spect for the rule of law.” The Chamber found that Section 3 might be regarded 
as pursuing such aims.77 On the other hand, the Chamber found no evidence 
that judges sentencing individuals mentioned disenfranchisement as one of the 
consequences of committing a crime, or took into account as part of the sen-
tencing process.78 These practical realities undercut the government’s argu-
ments that the provisions were justified as inflicting punishment, given that 
punishment is traditionally a function reserved exclusively for the court, and 
there was no record of the courts referring to the prisoner’s disenfranchisement 
in the context of discussing punishment. 
Disenfranchisement might sometimes be acceptable, for instance someone 
who was undermining a country’s democratic foundations, for example by the 
 
 71.  Representation of the People Act, 1983, § 3 (U.K.). These related to those impris-
oned for contempt of court, and those in prison for fine default. 
 72.  Free expression is used in the Protocol specifically in relation to the exercise of vot-
ing rights. It is not the same as First Amendment free expression that obviously applies in a much 
broader range of contexts. 
 73.  See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25 (recognising the 
right to vote without distinctions based on race). The Human Rights Committee has concluded 
that prisoner disenfranchisement laws in the United States breached the requirements of the Inter-
national Covenant. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of 
America, UN Doc. CCPR/C/U.S.A/CO/3/Rev.1/2006, at [INSERT WEBSITE]. Sloss notes that 
the United States ratified the ICCPR subject to a reservation with respect to race-based distinc-
tions rationally related to a legitimate government objective. Sloss, supra note 47, at 455. 
 74.  Hirst, 681 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Michael Plaxton & Heather Lardy Prisoner, Disenfran-
chisement: Four Judicial Approaches, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 101 (2010); Susan Easton, Elect-
ing the Electorate: The Problem of Prisoner Disenfranchisement, 69 MODERN L. REV. 443 
(2006); William Powers, Hirst v. United Kingdom (No2): A First Look at Prisoner Disenfran-
chisement by the European Court of Human Rights, 21 CONN. J. INT’L L. 243 (2006); Ziegler, 
supra note 43. 
 75.  Hirst, 681 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 62. 
 76.  Id. at 69. 
 77.  Id. at 74. 
 78.  Id. at 77. 
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commission of voting fraud. However, it was not a step to be taken lightly, and 
there had to be a sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct and cir-
cumstances of the individual.79 Such a link was not evident here—the ban ap-
plied to a broad range of offenders, from those in jail for a short period to those 
sentenced to life imprisonment, there was no demonstrated link between a par-
ticular offender or offense and the removal of a right to vote, and there was no 
evidence of a government attempt to weigh the proportionality of the measure 
as against its impact on a fundamental right. The court held that the general, au-
tomatic and indiscriminate restrictions on such a fundamental right as the right 
to vote was incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol 1. 
In a subsequent decision, the Court has confirmed that the decision as to 
whether a particular individual should be prohibited from voting should be 
made by a court, rather than parliament. The need for a close link between the 
offense committed by the offender, and the sanction of disenfranchisement, was 
emphasized. So, for instance, it might be legitimate to deny the right to vote to 
someone convicted of electoral fraud, or sedition, but not crimes unrelated to 
democracy and voting, even very serious in nature.80 
C. Canada 
These issues arose for determination in Sauve v. Canada (Chief Electoral 
Officer).81 Section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act denied the right to vote to 
a person serving a term of imprisonment of at least two years. The applicant 
claimed the provision was incompatible with Section 3 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, guaranteeing Canadian citizens the right to vote, and 
Section 15, guaranteeing equality under the law and a right not to be discrimi-
nated against due, among other things, to national or racial origin. These rights 
are of course not absolute, Section 1 contemplating reasonable limits prescribed 
by law that could be justified in a free and democratic society. 
The majority considered and dismissed three government arguments in 
favor of the regime.82 The government argued, pursuant to Section 1 of the 
 
 79.  Id. at 71. 
 80.  Frodl v. Austria, 508 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) (holding that Austrian legislation prohibit-
ing those sentenced to more than one year in prison and involving an offense including intend was 
incompatible with the Convention). 
 81.  [2002] 3 S.C.R 519 (Can.). 
 82.  Other arguments sometimes presented in support of disenfranchisement include the 
social contract, that an offender has breached such contract and thereby forfeited their right to par-
ticipate in society’s governance. E.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 335, 351 (2nd Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 
1978) (felons have breached the social contract and, like insane persons, have raised questions 
about their ability to vote responsibly). This reasoning is open to the criticism that Locke should 
not be taken to be in favor of permanent disenfranchisement, writing instead of proportionate re-
sponses to wrongdoing to allow for reparation and restraint. The Disenfranchisement of Ex-
Felons, supra note 11, at 1304–07. Ewald notes that Locke was writing at a time when the fran-
chise was routinely denied to women, servants, soldiers, and men without property, so it was un-
surprising that Locke would deny criminals the right to vote. Ewald, supra note 9, at 1075. It also 
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Charter, that the measures sent an educative message regarding the importance 
of respect for the law to inmates and the citizenry at large, that allowing prison-
ers to vote demeaned the political system,83 and that disenfranchisement was a 
legitimate form of punishment.84 The majority accepted the concept of the sov-
ereignty of the people and the fact that representative government involved a 
delegation of power from the people to the legislature. A universal franchise 
was an essential part of democracy. Denying a citizen the right to vote denied 
the basis of democratic legitimacy.85 Disenfranchisement was more likely to 
undermine respect for the law and democracy than to enhance it.86 The idea that 
certain classes of people were not morally fit or worthy to vote was anachronis-
tic.87 There was no evidence that disenfranchisement deterred crime or rehabili-
tated criminals,88 and it would have a disproportionate impact on the Aboriginal 
population.89 
D. Summary of Position in Comparable Nations 
The above three cases recognize the fundamental nature of the franchise in 
a democratic system, and reflect how the courts have viewed with great skepti-
cism arguments by governments about the supposed need to create exceptions 
to universal suffrage in the case of prisoners. In each of them, attempts to deny 
 
reflected a time when voting was seen as a privilege as opposed to a right. As Ewald says, the idea 
that single criminal transgression constitutes a repudiation of the entire social contract conjures up 
raw Hobbesian ideas of the compact, in which one is either fully inside the body or completely 
outside it. This view might have made sense in the walled cities of the Renaissance, but today it is 
an anachronism. Id. at 1103. 
 83.  “There are also traces of this in the United States jurisprudence; for example, the 
manifest purpose [of disenfranchisement] is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the 
only sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs protection against the invasion of cor-
ruption . . . the presumption is, that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base 
offence indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage.” Wash-
ington v. State, 51 Am. Rep. 479, 481 (1884); see also Alec Ewald, An Agenda for Demolition: 
The Fallacy and the Danger of the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Prisoner Disenfranchise-
ment, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 109 (2005). 
 84.  It has been noted that whilst in historical times, deprivation of civil liberties, most 
notoriously civil death was imposed as a form of punishment, but few states today (at least explic-
itly) rely on such rationale for disenfranchisement provisions. The Equal Protection Clause as a 
Limitation on the States Power, supra note 11, at 310. Ewald claims that disenfranchising crimi-
nals fails to serve any of the traditional purposes of the criminal law, such as retribution, incapaci-
tation, deterrence or rehabilitation. Ewald, supra note 9, at 1105-06. It was unlikely that a person 
planning to commit a crime would weigh up the loss of voting entitlements in deciding whether or 
not to commit the crime, and disenfranchisement would often lack the kind of proportionality that 
is typically a feature of administering punishment for wrongdoing. Id. 
 85.  Suave, [2002] 3 S.C.R 519, at 32–33 [THESE PAGE NUMBERS DON’T SEEM 
TO BE RIGHT TO ME, CHECK NOTES 80-84. MILA] (McLachlin, CJ., Iacobucci, Binnie, Ar-
bour & LeBel, JJ.). 
 86.  Id. at 41. 
 87.  Id. at 43. 
 88.  Id. at 49; Alice Harvey called it a gratuitous impediment to re-entry into the commu-
nity. Harvey, supra note 11, at 1174. 
 89.  Suave, [2002] 3 S.C.R 519, at 60. 
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the franchise to currently serving prisoners foundered on the basis of incompat-
ibility with the fundamental human right to vote. 
The following summary may be made of the international material: 
(1) Explicit recognition in a range of jurisdictions of the fundamentally 
important nature of the broad franchise as an essential element in a 
system of representative government, where sovereignty lies with the 
people. 
(2) Reluctance to see disenfranchisement as punishment and reinforce-
ment that punishment needs to be carried out by courts, not legisla-
tures, in any event. 
(3) Confirmation in each case that the right to vote, though fundamental, 
was not an absolute right. 
(4) Any restriction on such a right would need to be well justified by the 
legislature, carefully limited and tailored to a specific legitimate inter-
est. 
(5) Arbitrary disenfranchisement, not taking into account the length of 
sentence given to a prisoner, or the nature of the crime they commit-
ted, is not acceptable. In terms of the nature of the crime committed, 
most relevant is whether the person has committed a crime with re-
spect to elections themselves or a crime otherwise related to the sys-
tem of democratic government itself; the mere fact that the person has 
committed a serious offense does not mean that disenfranchisement is 
justified 
(6) Some linking of the right to vote with rights to expression, and con-
ception of a vote as an expression of something. 
As may be implicit, I am broadly in favor of the above principles. They 
reflect the fundamental nature of the franchise, as preservative of all other 
rights, to a democratic system of government. All of the jurisdictions studied 
would consider themselves to be democracies. The fundamental nature of the 
franchise must be the starting point in the consideration of any regime that pur-
ports to detract from this right. This reflects the idea of the people as the sover-
eign body, ceding certain powers to the legislature to act on their behalf, but 
always with the power to remove a legislature that is not accurately reflecting 
their will. This system is imperiled when moves are made to disenfranchise 
members of the sovereign body. 
That having been said, the right to vote is not absolute. Some limitations 
on this right may be accepted. However, these would need to be very narrowly 
tailored to a legitimate public interest, and not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve this legitimate objective. This type of balancing regime is typical of 
human rights discourse around the world. For instance, it may be justified to 
deny the franchise to those guilty of an electoral fraud type offense—that is, to 
people intent on attacking the very system of democratic government of which 
the voting right is a part. While a restriction there may be justified, the same 
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cannot be said for sweeping disenfranchisement provisions that take no or little 
account of the nature of the crime committed, or any threat that it poses to 
democratic government. Laws of this nature have generally been identified as 
arbitrary and disproportionate, and in the balance between human rights and 
legitimate government regulation of rights, have often been found wanting. 
Generally, courts in the jurisdictions being studied disfavor arbitrary exercise 
of power, and laws that operate in a disproportionate manner. Essentially, these 
characteristics are rightly seen as indicators of unjust laws. 
Past arguments supporting prisoner disenfranchisement have often been 
motivated by underlying racism, in the knowledge that such laws impact ad-
versely on African Americans. The court saw through such schemes. Argu-
ments that voting is reserved for the morally pure belong to a different era 
when government believed it could enforce morality on citizens, or where we 
believed there was some kind of common morality. To the extent that morality 
has religious overtones, they have no place in a secular society. The argument 
that disenfranchisement is legitimate punishment has not been accepted interna-
tionally, and I agree with this conclusion. This argument is weak because it in-
fringes separation of powers principles to which all jurisdictions being studied 
adhere, which would characterize the infliction of punishment as a power that 
was judicial in nature. Such a power should not, consistent with the separation 
of powers principle, be exercised by the legislature. 
III. APPLICABILITY TO THE UNITED STATES 
In this part, I consider several ways in which the jurisprudence in the 
United States in this area might be informed by the preceding discussion of rel-
evant comparative material. Specifically, I make three points: the first concern-
ing the links between a universal franchise and representative government, the 
second concerning the status of disenfranchisement as punishment, together 
with the respective roles of legislatures and courts with respect to punishment, 
and the third conceiving voting as an expressive activity worthy of First 
Amendment protection. 
A. Fundamental Importance of Universal Franchise to the System of Rep-
resentative Government for Which the Constitution Provides 
As indicated, in the Australian Roach decision, the High Court deduced 
“the right to vote” from two sections of the Australian Constitution, Sections 7 
and 24, which confirmed that parliament (congress) should be “directly cho-
sen” by the people.90 These rights were then used to constitutionally invalidate 
 
 90.  For example, The House of Representatives shall be composed of members directly 
chosen by the people of the Commonwealth, and the number of such members shall be, as nearly 
as practicable, twice the number of senators. The number of members chosen in the several States 
shall be in proportion to the respective numbers of their people, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 
24, the Senate shall be composed of senators for each State, directly chosen by the people of the 
State. Id. at s 7. 
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legislation disenfranchising those in detention for any offense. Australia does 
not have a bill of rights, or anything equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
or relevant provisions of the Voting Rights Act. There is no direct equivalent to 
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment in the Australian Constitution. Howev-
er, the Australian Constitution did borrow extensively from the United States 
Constitution.91 
Article 1, Section 2 of the United States Constitution states that “the 
House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second 
Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall 
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of 
the State legislature.”92 This section can be read as indicative of the fact that a 
universal franchise is fundamental to the representative system of government 
for which the Constitution provides. So concerned is the document with voting 
rights that numerous amendments to the document prohibit denial of voting 
rights, for example due to race, “previous servitude,” gender, age or failure to 
pay tax93 are constitutionally forbidden. It is true that states are free to deter-
mine what qualifications are required for electors,94 but this is subject to the 
Constitution. 
It can be argued that Article 1, Section 2 and the Seventeenth Amendment 
confer a general franchise right, reflecting the overwhelmingly democratic 
theme of the United States Constitution and system of government, such that 
denial by a state of the voting rights of prisoners or ex-prisoners is contrary to 
that system of government, and unconstitutional. Article 1, Section 2 is in terms 
very similar to the provision upon which the High Court of Australia’s deter-
mination that the Constitution presumed a representative system of govern-
ment, in particular Section 24 of the Constitution. The only real difference is 
that Section 24 requires that the legislature by chosen directly by the people, 
while Article 1 Section 2 says that the House of Representatives in the United 
 
 91.  One of the greatest Australian jurists, Sir Owen Dixon, noted that the Australian 
founding fathers followed with remarkable fidelity the model of the American instrument of gov-
ernment and referred to differences between the Australian and American models as intangible. 
OWEN DIXON, JESTING PILATE 102, 104. In a tribute to John Marshall, former United States Su-
preme Court Chief Justice, he spoke of the American model as an inspiration to the drafters of the 
Australian Constitution. Id. at 109. In a tribute to former United States Supreme Court Justice Fe-
lix Frankfurter, he noted to Australia, no small part of the constitutional law of the United States 
must be of first importance. Id. at 180. 
 92.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (capitalization as in the original text). The Seventeenth 
Amendment provides similarly with respect to the Senate.  
 93.  U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. There is no equivalent in the Austral-
ian Constitution. 
 94.  This provision has been interpreted broadly, to delegate broad power to the states in 
determining their own election laws; as a result, many states have limited the fundamental right to 
vote for segments of their population, including by the use of districting plans, which may be val-
id. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1236 (2013). Other recent examples include the passage of 
voter identification laws, and early voting restrictions. I do not wish to understate the vast power 
that currently exists with state governors and legislatures in this field, but suggest that a more ro-
bust interpretation of the requirements of the Constitution might serve to curtail such power. 
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States shall be chosen by the American people.95 This would be a rare but not 
unprecedented example of the use of Australian developments to inform the 
development of United States electoral law and practice.96 More generally, 
there is a growing literature on the influence on United States law of compara-
tive and/or international law.97 
The United States Supreme Court has found that Article 2 section 1, and 
its requirement that Congress be chosen by the people, implies something ap-
proaching one vote, one value. The Court noted there that the Section required 
that “each voter should have a voice equal to that of every other in electing 
members of Congress.”98 Obviously, this is contradicted when some would-be 
voters are denied the franchise. 
It must be conceded that most of the challenges to electoral laws on the 
basis of disenfranchisement have instead occurred under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,99 a provision without direct counterpart in Australia. However, 
one advantage of dealing with the issue under Article 1, Section 2 of the United 
States Constitution, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, is that the existing 
position that the Equal Protection provision only apply upon proof of discrimi-
natory intent, would be obviated. Article 1, Section 2 could be read to confer a 
right to vote, such that attempts at disenfranchisement could be directly at-
tacked upon this basis, without the need to show any particular legislative in-
tent.100 
B. Reluctance To See Disenfranchisement as Punishment and Insistence 
that Punishment Be Carried Out by Courts, Not Parliament 
 
 95.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 24. 
 96.  One example in this space was the adoption of an Australian ballot system with can-
didates’ names listed, rather than the previous write-in system. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 
446 (1992). 
 97.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Ken Kersch, Outsourcing Authority? Cita-
tion to Foreign Court Precedent in Domestic Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Internation-
al Relations Theory 69 ALB. L. REV. 771 (2009); Rene Provost, Judging in Splendid Isolation, 56 
AM. J. COMP. L. 125 (2008); TOM BINGHAM, WIDENING HORIZONS: THE INFLUENCE OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DOMESTIC LAW (2010); David Fontana, Re-
fined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001). Recently, in the spe-
cific context of the criminal law, the climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability 
of a particular punishment is not irrelevant. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (cit-
ing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982)). Generally, there is an increasing realization 
that questions of interpretation of the law of any country, including the United States, can only 
benefit by a consideration of how equivalent issues have been dealt with elsewhere. 
 98.  Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 10 (1964). 
 99.  Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330 (1972). 
 100.  Katherine Shaw, Invoking the Penalty: How Florida’s Felon Disenfranchisement 
Law Violates the Constitutional Requirement of Population Equality in Congressional Represen-
tation and What to do About It, 100(3) NW. U. L. REV. 1439 (2006); Rosanna Taormina, Defying 
One Person One Vote: Prisoners and the Usual Residence Principle, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 431 
(2003). 
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The Australian Constitution provides for a precise delineation between the 
three arms of government, reflected in three chapters of the document dealing 
with the legislature, executive, and judiciary.101 The influence of the American 
Constitution is again clearly evident in the adoption of such a structure. 
The Australian High Court has been very concerned, particularly in recent 
years, to preserve the separation of powers for which the Constitution provides. 
This has meant, for instance, that a court cannot be conferred with powers that 
would lead outside observers to believe that the courts’ independence from oth-
er arms of government had been compromised.102 Similarly, the court has not 
accepted legislation purporting to direct the court in the exercise of its discre-
tion.103 A court cannot be required to act in a non-judicial way.104 
There are numerous references from judges to the exclusive nature of their 
power to punish. Justice McHugh in Nicholas v The Queen referred to the 
courts having an “exclusive function of the adjudgment and punishment of 
criminal guilt,”105 and he has noted that a “proceeding which requires . . . the 
imposition of punishment following determination [of guilt] is a traditional ex-
ercise of judicial power.”106 Chief Justice Griffith spoke of impositions of pen-
alties and punishments as being matters “appertaining exclusively to [judicial] 
power.”107 In Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government 
and Ethnic Affairs, Justices Brennan, Deane, and Dawson refer to the “exclu-
sively judicial function of adjudging and punishing criminal guilt.”108 
 
 101.  See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION cc. I–III. 
 102.  Kable v Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 15 (Austl.). 
 103.  S. Austl. v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
 104.  Wainohu v N.S.W. (2011) 243 CLR 181 (Austl.). 
 105.  (1998) 193 CLR 173, 220 (Austl.) (emphasis added); see also id. at 186 (Brennan, 
CJ.) (“one of the exclusively judicial functions of government is the adjudgment and punishment 
of criminal guilt”), id. at 231 (Gummow, J.) (“the imposition of penalties and punishments are 
matters appertaining exclusively to the judicial power”) (quoting Waterside Workers Federation 
of Australia v. J F.3D Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434, [PIN CITE] (Griffith, CJ.)), id. at 278 
(Hayne, J.) (“nothing in [the Act] purports to take any question of adjudging or punishing criminal 
guilt under a law of the Commonwealth away from the courts”). Mr Hemming seems to think it 
makes a difference that these comments made by McHugh J were in the context of a federal law. 
Id. at 228. Surely the point of the Kable decision is that these principles are of universal applica-
tion; we do not have different rules applicable at federal and state level in terms of fundamental 
questions such as separation of powers. Obviously, separation of powers includes questions like 
what courts do, and what parliaments do. Brennan CJ recognised this expressly in Nicholas: the 
function of adjudication and punishment of criminal guilt under a law of the Commonwealth can 
be exercised only by those courts in which the necessary jurisdiction is vested pursuant to Chapter 
III of the Constitution. Those courts include, relevantly for present purposes, the County Court of 
Victoria. Id. at 186–87. 
 106.  Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 23 (Austl.). 
 107.  Waterside Workers 25 CLR at 444 (emphasis added). 
 108.  (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (emphasis added); referring to judicial power, they said its 
most important aspect was the adjudgement and punishment of criminal guilt: that function apper-
tains exclusively to, and could not be excluded from, the judicial power of the Commonwealth; 
see also Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 186 (Austl.) (Brennan, CJ.), Re Tracey ex 
parte Ryan (1988) 166 CLR 518, 580 (Austl.) (Brennan, J.); Chief Justice Mason in Polyukovich v 
Cth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 537 (Austl.) stated it in negative terms that “a statute which contains no 
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References to this principle also appear in the European Courts. In the 
Privy Council in the United Kingdom in Reyes v. The Queen, Lord Bingham, 
for the Court, concluded that “a non-judicial body cannot decide what is the 
appropriate measure of punishment to be visited on a defendant for a crime he 
has committed.”109 In the recent Frodl decision, the European Court of Human 
Rights confirmed that the decision regarding disenfranchisement had to be 
made by a court, not a legislature.110 
These Australian and European decisions reflect a strong re-assertion of 
the separation of powers principle, and that a consequence that is classified as 
punishment belongs in the judicial column. 
Of course the United States Constitution was also greatly influenced by 
Montesquieu’s separation of powers theory.111 This was an idea conceived 
from notions of liberty that one way to avoid excessive and arbitrary govern-
ment power was to divide it among three arms of government—the legislative, 
executive, and judicial. Each arm would act as a check and balance on the oth-
ers. The government of the United States, more than most countries, reflects 
this idea, with the executive power reposed in the President, the legislative 
power in Congress, and the judicial power in the Supreme Court and lower 
courts. There is concern when these powers are mixed within one body and 
when one arm of government appears to be exercising powers traditionally ex-
ercised by another arm of government.112 
In some jurisdictions, separation of powers principles have been used to 
deny the power of the legislature to impose what is considered “punishment,” 
on the basis that punishment of an offender is an exclusively judicial function, 
such that to give such power to the legislature is a breach of the separation of 
powers principle for which the Constitution provides. There is less discussion 
of sentencing being an exclusively judicial function in the case law,113 although 
the Supreme Court has noted that Congress has acknowledged that sentencing 
 
declaration of guilt and does not impose punishment for guilt is not a usurpation of judicial pow-
er”; R (Anderson) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 32, 39 (U.K.); Al-
Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 609–10, 650. Justice Kirby in Baker v The Queen (2004) 
223 CLR 513, 547 dissented that an attempt to involve the judiciary in the performance of puni-
tive decisions effectively already determined by parliament itself was offensive to the Kable doc-
trine. 
 109.  [2002] UKPC 11, 47. 
 110.  Frodl, [2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 508. 
 111.  “Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the 
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 112.  See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 113.  Indeed, federal sentencing . . .never has been thought to be assigned by the Constitu-
tion to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three branches of government. Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989). It is not the responsibility—or even the right—of this 
court to determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes. It is the legislatures. McCles-
key, 481 U.S. at 319. 
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“has been and should remain primarily a judicial function.”114 To date, this 
principle has not been used to attack the validity of provisions disenfranchising 
felons. However, I believe there is a good argument that blanket disenfran-
chisement is a punishment that the legislature is imposing, contrary to the re-
quirements of the separation of powers principle. 
Relatedly, justices have clarified that fundamental to a just sentencing 
process is individualized sentencing.115 I argue that the individualized sentenc-
ing principle is incompatible with existing blanket disenfranchisement laws 
currently in operation in many parts of the United States. In Miller v. Alabama, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles when a majority of the Court 
held that punishment needed to be graduated and proportional to the offender 
and the offense, such that sentencing practices based on mismatches between 
the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty were not ac-
ceptable.116 This reflected similar sentiment expressed in Graham v. Florida.117 
It is hard to see how blanket disenfranchisement, which takes no account of the 
nature of the felony committed and whether it bears any relationship or threat 
to the democratic system, reflects the requirement that sentencing be “graduat-
ed and proportional.” A more nuanced system is required. The risk of arbitrary 
or disproportionate sentencing is increased when those deciding upon punish-
ment take into account illegitimate factors like the offender’s race.118 
Scholars have lamented that the Supreme Court has not been as firm in re-
asserting separation of powers principles when the legislature has sought to 
narrow judicial discretion in the criminal law area as they might have been.119 
 
 114.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 390. Both substantive judgment in the field of sentencing and 
the methodology of rulemaking have been and remain appropriate to the judicial branch of the 
Federal Government. Id.362. 
 115.  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
303; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker the Court held that sentencing 
guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission could only be treated as guidelines, rather than 
be mandatory. Id. at 264. In so doing, it insisted that courts must be able to punish based on the 
real conduct of the offender and reaffirmed Congress policy of creating consistency in sentencing 
similar types of offender. Id. at 253–54. 
 116.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct 2455, 2463 (2012); Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
1229 (2011); SUSAN EASTON & CHRISTINE PIPER, SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT: THE QUEST 
FOR JUSTICE (2012); CASSIA SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? 225–41 (2009). 
 117.  See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2011 (“the concept of proportionality is central to the 
Eighth Amendment . . . , [it is a] precept of justice that punishment for a crime should be graduat-
ed and proportioned to the offence”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 249 (1910). 
 118.  McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For instance, some might take 
into account the race of the offender in arguing that the prevalence of a particular offense is higher 
among that race, so the need for deterrence is stronger in that instance. 
 119.  Rachel Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1042 (2006); Rachel Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an 
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 33 (2003). In one case, considering mandato-
ry sentencing guidelines, the court read them down as being advisory only, rather than binding, 
but the Court did not base this on the principle of separation of powers, but rather the role of the 
jury in assessing the existence of factors aggravating the defendants behaviour in relation to sen-
tence. Booker, 543 U.S. at 220. 
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In cases relating to rights other than voting, the court has seemed more con-
cerned with asserting prisoners’ constitutional rights.120 This raises questions 
regarding consistency of principle, and makes the acceptance of prisoner disen-
franchisement, implicating arguably the most important right in a democracy, 
seem even more anomalous. 
There is debate regarding whether disenfranchisement is punishment.121 
Those who have denied that disenfranchisement is punishment have argued in-
stead that disenfranchisement keeps the ballot box “morally pure,”122 or that 
only the intelligent or educated should be allowed to vote.123 An evolving soci-
ety, and a secular view of public life, has tended to sideline arguments about 
“moral purity.” How could this be judged, and by whom? Morality is not a 
proxy for criminality. We have long abandoned elitist notions that voting rights 
are only for the intelligent or educated, contrary as they are to the true concept 
of democracy. Arguably, this leaves us with punishment.124 Karlan for instance 
states that “the view that disenfranchisement is not punitive rests on a long 
since repudiated conception of the right to vote. The current conception so un-
 
 120.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 121.  Ziegler, supra note 43, at 207; Ewald, supra note 9, at 1058 (“the reality . . . is that 
United States criminal disenfranchisement policies are punitive, both in their design and in their 
results”). There is evidence today of the continued intent to apply disenfranchisement laws to in-
dividuals convicted of felonies as a form of punishment. Susan Marquardt, Deprivation of a Fel-
on’s Right to Vote: Constitutional Concerns, Policy Issues and Suggested Reform for Felony Dis-
enfranchisement Law, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 279, 297 (2005). Certainly, there is historical 
support for the suggestion that civil death was imposed as punishment. The Equal Protection 
Clause as a Limitation on the States Power, supra note 11, at 310. Infamy was employed as a re-
tributive measure to punish the criminal for his crime against society; the most straightforward 
explanation of [criminal disenfranchisement] provisions . . . is that they are penal in nature and 
that the deprivation of the franchise is yet another form of punishment that is imposed upon per-
sons convicted of felonies. BURT NEUBORNE & ARTHUR EISENBERG, THE RIGHTS OF 
CANDIDATES AND VOTERS 32–33 (1976); Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Restoring the Ex-
Offenders Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 730 (1972) 
(concluding that because the sanction occurs as a direct consequence of criminal convictions, and 
is not a mere qualification such as age or residency which may be met with the passage of time . . . 
disenfranchisement must be considered punitive); Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL 159, 177 (2001); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED 
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 162–63 (2000); State ex rel Barrett v. Sartori-
ous, 175 S.F.3D 2d 787, 788 (Mo. 1943); McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 
(S.D Miss. 1995); Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1214, 1228 (describing disenfranchisement as a punitive 
device stemming from criminal law). Some claim that disenfranchisement is not punishment per 
se, but an indirect consequence of criminal conviction. People v. Boespflug, 107 P.3d 1118, 1121 
(Colo. App. 2004). In Trop v. Dulles the court claimed that disenfranchisement was not a punish-
ment but rather designated a reasonable ground for eligibility for voting. 356 U.S. 86, 78 (1958). 
 122.  Hunter, 471 U.S. at 222. 
 123.  Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 45. 
 124.  H.L.A. Hart thought punishment involved (a) unpleasant consequences (b) for an 
offense against legal rules (c) of an actual offender (d) intentionally administered by humans other 
than the offender, and (e) imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system 
against which the offense is committed. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1 
(1968). Disenfranchisement meets each of these conditions. 
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dercuts originally regulatory justifications for disenfranchising offenders that 
only penal justifications remain.”125 
Chin notes that a condition of southern states’ re-entry into the Union was 
that they would not deny voting rights to individuals “except as punishment for 
crimes.”126 
Of some relevance here to the question of whether disenfranchisement is 
“punishment” in the criminal law realm, or something else, is the Supreme 
Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez127 established several factors to deter-
mine whether proceedings were criminal or civil in nature. There are: (a) 
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (b) whether 
it has historically been regarded as punishment; (c) whether it comes into play 
only on a finding of scienter; (d) whether its operations will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (e) whether the behav-
iour to which it applies is already a crime; (f) whether there is a rational con-
nection to a non-punitive purpose; and (g) whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.128 
Regarding (a), denial of a right to vote clearly represents an affirmative 
disability or restraint. The person affected is disabled and restrained from vot-
ing. Regarding criterion (b), I have indicated that disenfranchisement has his-
torical links with ideas of a civil death and punishment for egregious crimes. 
Regarding (c), this weighs against disenfranchisement being seen as a criminal 
consequence, since some of the crimes to which disenfranchisement might ap-
ply may not involve scienter. 
In relation to criterion (d), disenfranchisement has a retributive aspect. 
Above I referenced English and Canadian material in which governments ad-
mitted that at least one of their purposes in disenfranchising individuals was to 
punish them. According to criterion (e), the behaviour dealt with is a crime, 
suggesting that the proceeding that results in a person’s disenfranchisement is 
criminal in nature. Regarding (f), it is hard to find a rational connection be-
tween disenfranchisement and objectives other than punishment, given that ar-
guments about the “purity of the ballot box” have fallen out of favour and the 
consequence is not confined to crimes of a particular nature, for instance at-
tempts to rig elections, that might be more rationally explained in terms of non-
punitive intent. For instance, in those cases the government could have argued 
it was genuinely wishing to ensure that future elections were fair and the results 
a true reflection of the will and wishes of the people, so that the policy of disen-
franchisement furthered a legitimate, non-punitive objective. It is much more 
 
 125.  Pamela Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation and the De-
bate Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2004). 
 126.  Gabriel Chin, The Voting Rights Act of 1867: The Constitutionality of Federal Regu-
lation of Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. (2004); Fletcher, supra note 27. 
 127.  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 128.  Id. at 168–69. 
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difficult to make this argument when the consequence of disenfranchisement is 
applied to such a broad range of offenders. 
Regarding criterion (g), disenfranchisement removes one of the most im-
portant rights that an individual living in a democracy possesses. As such, it 
can appear excessive when applied to any felon, regardless of the nature of the 
crime they committed, and even more so when applied to someone who is no 
longer incarcerated or under probation.129 
Having considered each of the factors in this context, I conclude that the 
application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors tends to underscore the criminal 
and punitive nature of proceedings resulting in disenfranchisement. 
If it is accepted that disenfranchisement is punishment, the argument is 
that the courts, rather than the legislature, should administer it due to separa-
tion-of-powers arguments. The court, taking into account the individual cir-
cumstances of the case, might be authorized (at least in a very small number of 
cases) to order disenfranchisement as part of an individual prisoner’s punish-
ment.130 This might be appropriate, for example, where the offender has com-
mitted a crime with respect to elections, or is guilty of some other conduct in-
tended to undermine democratic processes, following the European case law 
earlier discussed. Disenfranchisement should not be mandated by the legisla-
ture. 
The other argument is that blanket disenfranchisement of felons risks 
leading to the kind of disproportional outcome of which the Supreme Court has 
rightly disapproved in other criminal cases. There must be proportionality be-
tween crime and punishment.131 Blanket disenfranchisement inhibits this from 
occurring. Karlan makes the same point: 
A categorical disenfranchisement of all ex-offenders convicted of a felony 
lumps together crimes of vastly different gravity. The irresistible political pres-
sure toward ever more criminalization means that much not particularly 
blameworthy conduct is classified as a felony. That potential sentences for a 
felony conviction range from crimes for which the statutory maximum is one 
year’s imprisonment to ones for which the maximum is death shows that all 
felonies are not equally serious.132 
This debate has sometimes occurred in the context of so-called mandatory 
sentencing laws, where a legislature may seek to direct the courts to a particular 
outcome in relation to punishment of an individual. The United States Supreme 
 
 129.  In Simmons, 575 F.3d at 56–70, Justice Torruella, dissenting, applied these factors, 
concluding that disenfranchisement was a punishment. 
 130.  Marquardt, supra note 113, at 297. Rather than voting rights being rescinded auto-
matically upon the commission of a felony, a judge would consider whether to include disenfran-
chisement as a part of criminal sentencing on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
 131.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455; Pepper, 131 S. Ct. 1229; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Weems, 
217 U.S. 249. Lifetime disenfranchisement—which continues to punish the offender long after she 
has served her sentence—clearly fails (the test of proportionality). Ewald, supra note 9, at 1103. 
 132.  Karlan, supra note 117, at 1167. 
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Court interpreted sentencing principles issued by the Sentencing Commission 
as guidelines only, rather than mandatory. In so doing, it insisted that courts 
must be able to punish based on the individual circumstances of the offender, 
and consistency in sentencing was fundamental.133 Again, these principles are 
offended by legislated blanket disenfranchisement of felons. 
Finally, there is the question of consistency on the issue of prisoners’ 
rights. Somewhat ironically, there is a suggestion that the courts have been 
more prepared to uphold the rights of prisoners in other constitutional contexts 
than in the fundamental context of voting. A recent illustration involved the 
question of the right of felons to firearms, and the applicability of the Second 
Amendment in such cases. Recently, a District Court judge struck out a Louisi-
ana law banning felons from owning firearms. The judge accepted an argument 
that the ban, applying to a fundamental right, was overbroad. It was potentially 
applicable to an overly broad range of offenders, including those who had not 




C. Voting is Expression and an Exercise of First Amendment Rights 
My other argument here is that voting is a form of expression and entitled 
to first amendment protection. Laws that disenfranchise felons and ex-felons 
can be argued to contravene the First Amendment. Obviously, rights protected 
by the Constitution cannot be deprived by the legislature. Were the court to ac-
cept this argument, it would obviate the need to overrule the longstanding 
Richardson precedent, given that when it validated prisoner disenfranchisement 
laws, it did not specifically reject arguments that the First Amendment preclud-
ed such laws. 
Case law and academic opinion have viewed voting as a form of expres-
sion. Most recently in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, Justice Alito 
noted that “voting has an expressive component in and of itself.”135 In Doe v. 
 
 133.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 220. 
 134.  New Orleans Judge Rules Statute Forbidding Felons from Having Firearms Uncon-
stitutional After Fundamental Rights Amendment, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, March 21, 2013. The 
decision is currently on appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Previously, the United States Su-
preme Court has accepted bans on felons owning weapons. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008) (dicta). 
 135.  Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2354 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing because the majority denied that a law preventing a member of congress from voting 
was violative of first amendment principles). The finding of the majority is not directly relevant 
here because they expressly distinguished between a person exercising a right to vote, and a mem-
ber of congress exercising a right to vote, in terms of the expression involved. The author person-
ally finds this distinction troubling, as Justice Alito did in the case, but this issue need not be fur-
ther explored here. It is sufficient to note that nothing in the majority judgment denies that when 
an individual exercises a personal right to vote, they are engaged in expressive activity. 
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Reed, the Supreme Court found that signing a petition calling for reforms was 
the expression of a political view.136 The fact that no one knew why the view 
was held, how strongly it was held, or whether the view had been well-
considered or not, was irrelevant.137 This view enjoys academic support.138 
The United States Supreme Court has robustly defended First Amendment 
freedom of speech. Speech on public issues and/or surrounding campaigns for 
political office occupies the “highest rung” and is entitled to special protec-
tion,139 with restrictions requiring compelling justification.140 Consistent with 
the fundamental link between a broad franchise and representative government, 
the court has noted that a representative democracy ceases to exist when a con-
stituent can be restrained from communicating about political matters.141 A per-
son cannot be barred from speaking because those in control of government 
think that what is said or written is foolish, unfair, false or malicious.142 It was 
imperative for the continuation of representative government that government 
remained responsive to the will of the people, and that any desired change be 
secured through peaceful means. This meant that free speech was “invio-
 
 136.  Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2817, 2829, 2830 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(referring to the expressive act of petition signing) (Stevens, J., concurring) (acknowledging the 
casting of a vote served an expressive purpose). Further, in Burdick, the Supreme Court referred to 
expressive activity at the polls. 504 U.S. at 438  
 137.  It is considered relevant to note this to counter arguments that voting is effectively 
not expression because of the low quality of the message it communicates. Low quality here 
means that the precise message the voter is intending to convey in casting their vote in a certain 
way is admittedly often unclear, beyond a broad approval for one candidate, or one political party, 
over another. 
 138.  GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE 
THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE (1993). Voting is essentially an expressive exercise. Id. By 
voting, the individual shows something of herself, displaying desires, beliefs, judgments and per-
ceptions. The voter gives voice to her sentiments and views, concretizes them and asserts them, 
though anonymously, through the marking of the candidates name or the yes or no of a referen-
dum. Adam Winkler, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 333 (1993); see also Jason 
Halperin, A Winner at the Polls: A Proposal for Mandatory Voter Registration, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 69, 103 (2000) (there is a strong argument to be made that voting is a form of 
speech); Graeme Orr, The Choice Not to Choose: Commonwealth Electoral Law and the With-
holding of Preferences, 23 MONASH U. L. REV. 285 (1997). Some consideration of voting as ex-
pressive activity occur in the context of the question of compulsory voting, but authors there also 
see voting as expressive. Jeffrey Bloomberg, Protecting the Right Not to Vote from Voter Purge 
Statutes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1015, 1016–17 (arguing that abstention from voting was political 
expression protected by the First Amendment); Heather Lardy, Is There a Right Not to Vote?, 
24(2) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 318 (2004); The Case for Compulsory Voting in the United 
States, 121 HARV. L. REV. 591, 603 (2007). 
 139.  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011); Police Dep’t of the City of Chicago 
v. Morales, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (above all else, the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its con-
tent); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 (1982) (the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and 
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office). 
 140.  Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 540 
(1980). 
 141.  N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964). 
 142.  Id. at 299. 
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late.”143 The court has been especially concerned with provisions affecting 
speech that are narrowly targeted to a small number of individuals or organiza-
tions.144 This is for two reasons—the fact that those targeted are relatively few 
in number limits the ability of the ballot box to remedy the situation.145 This 
concern is surely even greater when the restriction on speech at issue is voting, 
as is discussed here. Secondly, the more narrowly targeted the measures, the 
more likely that they are seen as an attempt to censor particular views, again 
seen as particularly egregious in First Amendment jurisprudence.146 
It is argued that disenfranchisement is readily challengeable on First 
Amendment grounds. The casting of a vote is expression, and in the pantheon 
of expressive rights, is of the highest order in the political context. Restrictions 
require compelling justification. It is hard to see that there is compelling justifi-
cation for disenfranchisement measures and even if there is, the measures are 
not narrowly targeted to reflect such justification, as I argue below. (While the 
discussion below might appear to repeat what was said earlier about the ques-
tion of punishment, it is placed here because it is in application of the test of 
“compelling justification,” which would justify interference with First 
Amendment rights, according to the case law—as such I believe it is appropri-
ately placed). 
For instance, it cannot today be seriously argued that the measures are jus-
tified by the need to reserve the right to vote to the “morally pure.” There is an 
insufficient link between criminal activity and moral purity. The question of 
what is “morally pure” is a subjective and value-laden one. Many things some 
would consider morally impure are not criminal. 
In addition, as the Canadian Supreme Court noted, there is no evidence 
that disenfranchisement deters crime or serves a rehabilitative purpose, so these 
cannot be relied upon. Arguments that disenfranchisement is compellingly jus-
tified as an aspect of punishment are also highly questionable, given it is tradi-
tionally the role of a court to administer punishment, and blanket disenfran-
chisement raises concerns about the arbitrary and disproportional 
“punishment.” The Supreme Court has recently reconfirmed that sentencing 
without any penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the of-
fense.147 
 
 143.  De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937). Subject to extremely limited excep-
tions such as speech inciting violence. Id.  
 144.  Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
585 (1983); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). 
 145.  See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating 
that where a measure is likely to curtail the operation of political processes that can ordinarily be 
relied on to protect minorities, greater scrutiny might be justified). 
 146.  The Supreme Court has been particularly concerned, in First Amendment jurispru-
dence, with laws banning or regulating speech because of the viewpoint it expresses. Good News 
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 147.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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It is possible that denial of the franchise to those convicted of electoral 
fraud, for example, is justifiable if the measures are narrowly cast. A serious 
argument could be made based on legitimate fears that the offender could at-
tempt to pervert the democratic process if allowed to vote. Measures respond-
ing narrowly to this genuine concern might (I put it no higher than this) pass the 
test of compelling justification. 
However, the disenfranchisement provisions are not so confined, applying 
to all felons, regardless of the particular individual or the nature of their crime. 
Certainly, the vast majority of those affected have not committed electoral 
fraud. Further, in some cases, these restrictions extend post-probation, post-
parole and post-incarceration. For this reason also, it is hard to see how there is 
compelling justification for such a restriction on expression, and this restriction 
is hardly narrowly tailored to reflect that interest. The court should be con-
cerned with measures that have the effect of prohibiting a small number of 
people from exercising this expression right at the ballot box, given the inabil-
ity of those affected to practically remedy the wrong. And targeting of a small 
population, such as prisoners, can be perceived as an attempt to censor particu-




In so many ways, the United States has set an example to the world in 
terms of rights protection. Its Bill of Rights has been an example to others of 
the kinds of human rights that warrant protection, and has been adopted and 
adapted in many jurisdictions subsequently. In this light, the protection given 
(or not given) to voting rights presents a real anomaly. This Article seeks to 
understand the present situation in terms of the racism that has plagued the 
United States (as with many countries), given past attempts to deny the fran-
chise to African Americans, and the clearly disproportionate impact that felon 
disenfranchisement laws have on racial minorities, African Americans in par-
ticular. The United States has come a long way on expanding the franchise and 
in dealing with its race issues, but there are further legal steps to go. In particu-
lar, narrow interpretations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment, as well 
as the Voting Rights Act, have perversely allowed felon disenfranchisement, 
and its disproportionate impact on racial minorities, to continue. 
I suggest in this Article that the United States could look to developments 
in comparable countries in this area, and in particular the willingness of courts 
in other countries to strike down prisoner disenfranchisement laws as being 
 
 148.  These arguments are quite different from arguments that disenfranchisement is bad 
public policy, perpetuating an offenders sense of alienation and disengagement from society. See 
The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality and the Purity of the Ballot Box, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989). 
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contrary to representative democracy, to seriously question claimed justifica-
tions for such provisions, to ensure that any restrictions are narrowly tailored to 
reflect any legitimate governmental interests, and to insist that disenfranchise-
ment is punishment to be administered by a court rather than a legislature, up-
holding separation of powers principles. I also suggest that voting should be 
seen as an expressive right worthy of First Amendment protection, and special 
protection given its links to the democratic system of government for which the 
Constitution provides. It would be extremely difficult for governments to show 
compelling justification for the kind of restriction on political expression 
caused by prisoner disenfranchisement laws, or that such restrictions are nar-
rowly tailored to any such interest that does exist. 
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